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ings, the welfare hearings of the Department of Social Services, the Coastal
Commission, and numerous other agencies not covered by the adjudication sections of the existing APA.
10. Of course, other legislation may
expand the coverage of OAH, make ALJ
decisions final, or transfer the adjudicatory power of agency heads to a separate
administrative court. For example, the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board and the State Bar Court are autonomous bodies that are separated from
the investigation and prosecution units of
the ABC or the State Bar. In addition, it
is possible that legislation will make
final the decisions of ALJs in cases involving medical professionals. The new
APA will apply to whatever adjudicatory
format is prescribed by agency-specific
reform legislation.
11. Under Proposed Government Code
section 643.320, prosecutory and adjudicative functions must be separated
within the agency. This is accomplished
by isolating the presiding officer and the
agency heads from receiving advice
from staff members who played adversarial roles in the case.
12. The Attorney General opposes
this provision. See Appendix B of the
AG's letter cited in note 4, supra.
13. Currently, a few agencies have
emergency "interim suspension" authority, including the State Bar, CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6007(c), the Medical
Board of California, CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11529, and other occupational licensing agencies within the Department of
Consumer Affairs, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 494.
14. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11507.6.
15. The Commission is suggesting
certain changes in APA discovery, such
as making discovery orders enforceable
at the agency level rather than requiring
trips to the superior court and introducing a system of continuing disclosure.
Proposed CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 645.210,
645.320.
16. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340 et seq.
17. See id. at §§ 11349(a), 11349.1(a)(1).
18. See Proposed CAL. GOv'T CODE
§§ 633.040, 633.050.
19. The AG also furnished a long list
of specific changes he would favor in the
Commission's draft if it decides to go
forward with its more comprehensive approach. A copy of the AG's letter may
be obtained from the Commission. See
supra note 2.

VIAL COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDS
PUC REFORMS
By Michael Asimowl

ulation is being blasted by the
he staidofworld
of public
utilityofregwinds
change.
The forces
deregulation are gathering strength. It is
clear that the utility world of the future
will be regulated far more by market
forces than by state utility commissions. It
will no longer be possible to take six years
to fix a utility's rates when dynamic forces
change markets on a daily basis.
How should the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) regulate when its
role is no longer to set cost-of-service
prices for regulated monopolies but to protect consumers, assure adequate supplies,
and help utilities adapt in a world of competitive markets? In addition to its struggle
to cope with this frightening new world,
the PUC has been afflicted by problems
largely of its own
making, such as the re2
cent IRD fiasco.
To address these issues, an advisory
committee chaired bK former PUC President Donald Vial recently recommended significant changes in Commission procedures. Appointed by the Senate Committee on Energy and Public
Utilities, 4 the Vial Committee took a
fresh look at PUC management and procedure and recommended some fundamental changes. Among the many suggestions in its report, perhaps the following are the most important.
The Management Forum. The PUC
needs much stronger management. At
present, the perception is that nobody actually makes management decisions
about how to deal with pending matters
or how to scope the issues to be resolved
in pending cases.
The Vial Committee agreed that better management could be achieved by a
"Case and Issues Management Forum"
to make early decisions about how to
handle cases. For example, what procedural format is appropriate (rulemaking
or adjudication)? What issues should be
resolved, and which ones deferred? What
staff resources should be assigned to a
pending matter? The Forum should, ideally, consist of the PUC President, the
assigned commissioner, 5 and as many of
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the other commissioners as possible,
in
6
addition to key staff members.
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
Revisions. In order to implement this
highly desirable management reform,
however, the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act 7 must be amended. All five commissioners should be encouraged to participate in the Forum, but Bagley-Keene
prohibits meetings of more than two
commissioners without full compliance
with the open meeting law.
The PUC has been bedeviled by
Bagley-Keene on a number of occasions. Experience in California and in
other states makes it clear that frank discussion of difficult problems does not
occur in open meetings. Commissioners
must be able to disagree, candidly and
vigorously, with one another in ways
they will never do when the public is
watching. Staff must be willing to correct commissioners, although they know
they must never make their bosses look
bad in public meetings.
Thus, we must choose between letting the PUC deliberate in closed meetings or allowing it to be run with no deliberation at all. 9 As a result, the Vial
Committee unanimously favored a narrowly-tailored Bagley-Keene Act exception to permit the PUC to conduct closed
meetings concerning preliminary and
procedural aspects of pending cases. The
Commission would never consider the
merits of the substantive issues at these
meetings-only the non-substantive but
vital management issues.
Greater Use of Rulemaking. The
PUC is enslaved by a trial mentality. It
makes policy largely through case-bycase adjudication, often in the form of
ponderous cost-of-service ratemaking
cases conducted by its administrative
law judges (ALJs). The trials feature
endless cross-examination of a parade of
expert witnesses by counsel for all parties (including many intervenors). The
Vial Committee believes that the new realities of utility regulation no longer permit the luxury of policymaking through
courtroom theatrics.
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Thus, the Vial Committee favored
much greater use of rulemaking by the
PUC. 1 The trial culture of the agency
has inhibited it from trying to grapple
with policy issues through rulemaking,
but rulemaking is far better adapted for
policymaking than is adjudication. The
PUC must be able to establish the
ground rules for utility participation in
competitive markets, then get out of the
way. A majority of the Committee members agreed that the legislature should establish a rebuttable presumption that policy should be made through rulemaking
rather than adjudication, but there was
disagreement on this point.
Although the PUC is largely exempt
from the statute which governs the
rulemaking process in other state agencies, 1I1 the Vial Committee believes that
the PUC should comply with some of the
requirements of that statute. Thus, the
Committee agreed that the public must
be adequately notified of proposed rules
and have adequate opportunity to comment in writing and orally. The PUC
should be required to open its files so
that the public can examine its methodology. Also, the PUC should be required
to respond in the final rule to significant
criticisms or alternative suggestions offered by the public. And the public
should be permitted to petition for adoption of a new rule or for modification or
repeal of an existing one. The Commission also needs to explore intervenor
funding in rulemaking so that all interested parties can afford to take part in
the process.
There was also agreement that ex
parte contacts might be less stringently
regulated in rulemaking than in adjudication. 12 For example, ex parte contacts
in the rulemaking process might be unregulated up until the deadline for filing
the last round of comments; thereafter,
ex parte contacts would have to be disclosed and placed on the record.
In addition, the Committee generally
agreed that the PUC should experiment
with less formal rules, such as policy
statements, that can be adopted without
time-consuming public participation.
Policy statements inform both outside
parties and the staff of how the Commission intends to exercise a discretionary
power in the future. Policy statements
are tentative, not binding, but are very
helpful to anyone who must predict what
the PUC will do. Also, policy statements
are useful in that they guide the staff's
exercise of discretionary regulatory powers.
PUC Decisionmaking: Conference
Hearings. If the PUC must adjudicate-

and often it must, it should be clearly
empowered to conduct informal rather
than formal hearings in cases where determination of credibility is not at issue.
In an informal or "conference" hearing,
the ALJ would have power to dispense
with cross-examination and other trialtype procedures. Trial-type procedure is
appropriate and necessary when the issue
to be determined is truthtelling. But it is
very inefficient and costly both to members of the public and to the Commission
itself when the PUC is seeking to determine questions of legislative fact, law,
or policy.
The concept of a conference hearing
has been adopted in numerous states and
in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1981.13 In such hearings,
experts offer written testimony and all
parties may submit written and oral arguments. Cross-examination is not employed. It is unclear whether the PUC is
authorized to conduct informal hearings
under its existing statute; the Vial Committee favors legislative action to clearly
empower to PUC to use this approach.
Separation of Functions. The Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA) is
an independent entity within the PUC
charged with reviewing and analyzing
utility applications, participating in evidentiary hearings, and making recommendations in the best long-term interests of utility ratepayers. Because DRA
frequently participates as a party in adjudicative proceedings, present PUC
rules separate the staff members of DRA
from participation in decisionmaking.
The Commissioners are advised only by
members of the Commission Advisory
and Compliance Division (CACD), not
by DRA staff members. The Vial Committee rejected a proposal that DRA be
made even more independent by, for example, removing it from the Commission
or allowing it to appeal PUC decisions
to the Supreme Court.
But the Committee did not reach consensus on whether the existing system of
separation of functions might be relaxed.
For example, it might be possible to
allow DRA staff members who have not
worked on a particular case to advise the
Commission in non-prosecutory adjudicative proceedings, as opposed to the
present rule that excludes all DRA staff
from all advice-giving. 14 It might also be
possible to provide for less separation of
functions in rulemaking than in adjudication, 15 or to permit DRA to participate
in closed meetings of the Case and Issues Management Forum. 16 Some members favored allowing the director of
DRA to sit with the Forum since DRA

is a key part of the staff with great expertise and experience. Its participation
in making management decisions could
be very helpful. In addition, decisions
concerning allocation of PUC resources
affect DRA greatly. Other members of
the Vial Committee disagreed; they believe DRA should never have any more
access or opportunity for input than any
other party.
Alternative Dispute Resolution. The
PUC has made large strides in implementing alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) procedures. 17 Even more can be
achieved by using the processes of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration to
settle disputes. ADR is an absolute necessity in the brave new world of utility
competition. Many times, parties working together can come up with a win-win
settlement that is far superior to what an
agency could achieve through adjudication. Even when an all-party settlement
cannot be achieved, the process of trying
to achieve one can be very constructive
and may furnish the PUC with the basis
for an adjudicated outcome.
In addition, the PUC needs to experiment with negotiated rulemaking. Federal agencies report great success with
"reg-neg," and the federal APA now requires all agencies to consider this option. Not all disputes, and not all proposed rules, can be negotiated, but many
can.
The Vial Committee also took a look
at the PUC's practice of conducting
workshops on pending problems. Workshops are informal decision-facilitating
forums. They seem to work very well
and the Committee recommended that
the PUC adopt comprehensive workshop
guidelines.

CONCLUSION
If adopted, the Vial Committee's suggestions would make fundamental
changes in the way PUC does business.
All utility professionals should be aware
of the Vial Committee report and furnish
input to the PUC and
18 the legislature
about its suggestions.

ENDNOTES
1. Professor of Law, UCLA School
of Law.
2. The PUC's September 17, 1993
Implementation Rate Decision (IRD)
fundamentally restructured telephone
rates to accommodate competition in the
provision of toll call service. On the
night before the decision was released,
staff members from the telephone com-
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panies came to the PUC's offices and
helped to write portions of the decision.
When this conflict was disclosed, the
PUC felt compelled to rescind its decision. See Peter Arth, Jr., Lynn T. Carew,
Kenneth K. Henderson, Report to the
Commission: A Review of the Events
Surrounding D.93-09-076 (IRD) (Oct.
13, 1993); see also 14:1 CAL. REG. L.
REP. 166 (Winter 1994).
3. The author was a member of the
Vial Committee. Other members included Vice-Chair Barbara Barkovich, a
San Francisco attorney; Lynn T. Carew,
Chief Administrative Law Judge of the
PUC; Robert C. Fellmeth, Price Professor of Public Interest Law at the University of San Diego School of Law and Director of the Center for Public Interest
Law; Wesley Franklin, Assistant Executive Director of the PUC; Arturo
Gandara, Professor of Law, UC Davis
School of Law; Frederick E. John, President of Southern California Gas Company; Martin Mattes, a San Francisco attorney; and G. Mitchell Wilk, former
President of the PUC. The Vial Committee was assisted by David M. Gamson,
Senior Consultant to the Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities. The
opinions expressed in this article are the
author's alone.
4. The chair of the Senate Committee
is Senator Herschel Rosenthal. Senator
Rosenthal appointed a Subcommittee on
PUC Reforms which includes himself,
Senator Newton Russell, and Senator Alfred Alquist.
5. In all formal proceedings, one of
the PUC commissioners is assigned to
guide the case through PUC processing.
An administrative law judge conducts
public hearings, advises the assigned
commissioner of major developments,
and prepares a recommended decision
for Commission vote. The assigned commissioner then places that case on the
agenda of the full Commission for final
decision. Sometimes the assigned commissioner prepares an alternative decision to compete with the ALJ proposal.
6. These include the PUC's Executive Director and its General Counsel.
For discussion of whether the director of
the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA) should be allowed to sit
with the Forum, see infra text at note 16.
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11120 et seq.
8. See, e.g., letter from Floyd D.
Shimomura, Assistant Attorney General,
to PUC President Daniel W. Fessler
(Mar. 4, 1994), which is printed as an
appendix to Recommendations of the Advisory Group to the Subcommittee, Informational Hearing of the Senate Subcom-

mittee on Public Utilities Commission
Reforms (Mar. 8, 1994) (hereinafter "Informational Hearing"). This letter alleges
that several closed meetings concerning
PUC organization violated the BagleyKeene Act. The PUC's practice of "seriatim meetings," see infra note 9, has also
been questioned as possibly violative of
Bagley-Keene.
9. If open meeting laws apply, the
general experience has been that they
will be circumvented. For example, there
will be "seriatim meetings" (President
speaks to Commissioner A, then to B, C,
and D). Or staff members representing
each commissioner will meet to make
decisions based on the views of their
bosses. The actual open meetings tend to
be carefully scripted performances in
which no serious deliberation takes
place. These are clearly suboptimal
decisionmaking modalities. See Ashley
C. Brown, Sunshine May Cloud Good
Decision Making, F. FOR APPLIED RESEARCH & PUB. POL'Y (Summer 1992).
10. The PUC is fortunate to be almost wholly exempted from the onerous
rulemaking provisions of the California
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340 et seq., including the requirement of approval of
rules by the Office of Administrative
Law. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11351(a). See
Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
43, 48-51 (1992), for a brief description
of the APA rulemaking procedure in California. Thus, the PUC is free to structure
its own rulemaking procedures in ways
that facilitate maximum public input
consistent with efficient decisionmaking.
II. See supra note 10.
12. The Committee favored more restrictive provisions relating to ex parte
contacts in adjudication than apply under
existing rules. At present, ex parte contacts are permitted but must be disclosed.
The Committee suggests they be banned
after the deadline for filing reply comments.
13. MODEL

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981 § 4-401, 15
U.L.A. 1 (1990) (hereinafter "Model
State APA").
14. The Model State APA, supra note
13, would permit such advice-giving. Id.
at § 4-214(a). The separation of functions provision in the federal APA does
not apply at all to ratemaking or similar
types of adjudication. See 5 U.S.C. §
554(d)(B). See generally Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
759 (1981).
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15. The Committee did not reach
agreement on separation of functions in
rulemaking. It would seem, however,
that the customary rigid separation of
DRA members from giving advice to the
Commissioners might well be relaxed in
rulemaking proceedings.
16. Such participation would be permitted by the Model State APA, supra
note 13, which permits a person who
participated in a preliminary determination to serve as a presiding officer or advise a presiding officer in the same proceeding. Id. at § 4-21 4 (c).
17. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Hearing Before the Public Utilities
Commission (Oct. 12, 1993).
18. An informational hearing has already been held in which numerous interested parties discussed the Vial
Committee's recommendations. See Informational Hearing, supra note 8. The
Vial Committee's final report has been
published as Report of Advisory Working
Group on CPUCReforms to Senate Subcommittee on Public Utilities Commission Reforms of Senate Committee on
Energy and Public Utilities (June 1,
1994).

